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This paper seeks to identify the principle factors in 
labour migrancy in Africa through an analysis of its 
structural basis in a particular area and at a particular 
point in time* It accordingly offers a corrective to a 
sociology of the subject in which the fundamental aspects 
of the political economy giving context to migrancy are 
taken as given. In v/hat is a very extensive literature 
on migrancy causality has all too often been explored only 
at the level of the individual. The result is a plethora 
of 5 explanatory’ models ranging from V/ilson (after Mitchell) (1 ) 
to Todaro (2), with limited predictive powers as to probable 
patterns of migrancy under different sets of conditions, 
but which make no attempt tc explain those conditions. The 
deficiency is in part a consequence of the 'deliberate 
naivete* of the scholars concerned, but this 'deliberate 
naivete' itself derives from a major confusion in the 
literature. In the late 1950s Soper wrote that:
The actual causes of the initial movement 
into wage employment are relatively well 
understood. What is interesting is why, 
instead of settling permanently in the areas 
in which they have found employment, have 
so many African workers subsequently con­
tinued as migrants moving periodically to 
and from their rural homes? (p)
And the same concerns on top of the same complacency havo 
since recurred again and again. It is in fact highly 
questionable as to whethe* we do fully understand the 
range of socio-economic pressures making for African movement 
into wage employment. It is even more questionable as to 
whether we can profitably differentiate between the causes 
of African entry into the labour market, and their subsequent 
behaviour.
It is argued in this paper that labour migrancy derives from 
the structural dependence of the migrants on both wage labour 
and peasant or subsistence production, and that such dependence
1# T * V/ilson, Migrant South Africa, (Johannesburg,
1972); and Labour in the . uth ■ uP. can Mold Minos, (Cam­
bridge, 1972)• Wilson took as his point of departure 
J.C. Mitchell, 'The causes of labour migration', in Pro- 
ceedings of the Sixtl .n Labour Confcroiicrq
{ COTA, Abidjan, 19b’i) «
j
2. M.P. Todaro, 'A model of l:boiv* mi ,rat ion and urban 
unemployment in less dove.” • pod countries', American 
Economic Review, 59, 1. b9,
T.P. Soper, 'Labour mi , av 15 or. in .frica* , Journal of African 
Administration, X 1 , 2 , 1959 ; 9 5» >
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is a function of the manipulation of agricultural produce 
and labour markets in the interests of capital- It is 
further argued that the essence of such interests is to be 
sought in the specific requirements of the production 
regimes operated by the dominant fraction of capital in 
this instance by the mining industry. It is thus of critical 
importance to appreciate the nature of such requirements, 
as well as the manner in which they were satisfied, if the 
terms on v/hich Africans entered into wage employment - and 
consequently their behaviour in the labour market ~ are to 
be understood* The following sections of this paper 
accordingly seek to establish the specific connections 
between African dependence on both wage labour and peasant 
or subsistence production, and the requirements of the 
mining industry as they were satisfied through industry/state 
collaboration in the creation and manipulation of markets*.
II
The modern copper mining industry in Katanga was launched 
with the foundation of the Belgian Union Kini&re du Haut 
Katanga (UKHK) in 1906 (1 )« The preliminary prospecting 
had been handled by a British, company, Robert Williams’ 
Tanganyika Concessions Limited (TCL), and in 1906 this 
company secured a kO per cent holding in the UiiHK together 
with technical and labour management contracts that left 
it in control of company operations for at least the first 
few years (2 ) - a fact that was to be of some importance 
in determining the initial thrust of UIIHK labour 
mobilization strategies. In practice 1 prospecting1 had 
entailed only the location 01 the one hundred odd deposits 
that had been worked by the autochthonous peoples since the 
fifth century (J>). These deposits consisted entirely of 
high grade oxide (principally malachite) outcrops. But though 
they were rich, they were extremely remote - being located 
right in the middle of Africa and with no ready transport 
routes to the coast available. The cost ox infrastructural
1 . On the establishment of the UMIIK and early mining
development in the Congo Free State sec Union Minil-re du 
Haut Katanga, UKUK 1906-1996 , (UKHK, Brussels, 1956); 
and M. Robert, Geologie ct gdogranhie du Katanga, (B ru s s e ls , 
1956)o
2- TCL lost effective control of technical management of the 
UMHK in 1912, but retained control i.f the compounds until 
1919*
3* For pro-colonial mining along the C wigo-Zambezi watershed 
see M. Bisson, ’Prehistoric >.<. pertaining in North Western 
Zambia’, Archeology, 2?tA,197^? 2A-7-2A? 0
3.
development* and the landed price of the capital goods 
necessary to production were thus extremely high. Go too 
was the hiring price of skilled labour in the South African, 
European and American markets. By contrast industrially 
unskilled local labour could be engaged in limited quantities 
at comparatively low prices (1 ).
Initial production techniques were accordingly designed to 
make maximum possible use of unskilled labour. Mining was 
highly selective - only the highest grade of ore being 
removed - and all operations were carried out manually. 
Explosive holes were hand drilled, extraction was by pick 
and shovel, and tramming was by wheelbarrow and Decauville 
tip truck (coco pans). Although a scheme for concentration 
of the ore had been mooted, it was rejected in favour of 
hand sorting, and without further enrichment the ore was 
then reduced thermically in waterjacket furnaces. All 
handling of ores, fuels, fluxes, slag and copper was manual. 
Requirements of unskilled labour' on production work by 
output were accordingly high (2 ).
Moreover, between 1906 and 1912, these requirements were 
inflated by the needs of construction and development work, 
and this served further to boost demand for non-productive 
labour off the company’s properties. Given the absence of 
an orthodox transport infrastructure, and where the presence 
of tsetse fly made the use of pack animals impracticable, 
the movement of goods other than between major centres 
necessarily involved the use of porters. All foodstuffs, 
for example, were brought in to the mines in this manner, 
and in 1903 it was estimated t .. t in order to feed a v/ork
force of l i 0 0 a further 200 to >00 men were being used on
porterage (3)« The farther foodstuffs had to be carried 
the greater the number of porters necessary to get a given 
quantity to the destination since porters had themselves
to live off their burden. Over a distance of 1f>0 miles.
1. Gouverneur’s index of the cost of capital relative to 
the cost of labour ( 1 9 5 0 = 1 0 0) stood at 6? in 1 9 1 1«
J . Gouverneur, Productivity and factor -proportions in
less dcveloned conntrios(Oxford, 1971), Appendix IV, 
table 51, 151« Details of black wages before 1911 are 
unavailable, but in that year they averaged .5 7s per 
shift compared to between 25s and pOs for white labour.
2. On early production techniques in the mines see Union 
Miniere du Haul; Katanga, UP Of 1906-1956: Evolution des 
tochniniies et dos activi cl lies, 1 UliHK, Brussels* 1957)o
5. Archives of Tanganyika Ho Pings Ltd.; TC/UM 108:
A. Bertholet, Manager to H. Buttgenbach, Managing
Director UMHK, 16 April : , in i l .  Put t gen bach to
R» Williams, 10 June 15 . File references from this
source generally co. wcsc with the notation TO, and here­
after such references will stand alone.
for example, it v/as reckoned that oach porter would require 
?.8lbs of a 601b load to feed himself ori the outward and 
return journeys (1)* By 1903 two thirds of the company’s 
food supplies originated from buying stations more than 100  
miles from the mines, and at one buying station alone,
Kapiri, there wore employed more men on porterage than were 
recruited for construction, development and production work 
combined (2 ),
Labour recruitment and management was handled by a subsidiary 
of TCL, Robert Williams and Company, and in the period under 
examination they were responsible for supplying all the 
requirements of the three centres of operation - Ruwe,
Karabove and the Star of the Congo (with Lubumbashi) - as 
well as a proportion of the company's porterage requirements (3 ) 
By 1903 they had four white recruiters in the field, as well 
as engagement officers at each of the three compounds, and 
during that year the total number of engagements was slightly 
over 4000 (4). Of these more than half were engaged directly 
at the mines (5 ) and this implies a total voluntary labour 
flow of considerable size, suggesting the effectiveness of 
the measures taken to mobilize labour for the industry*
III
That the company could expect to operate a set of - highly 
unskilled labour intensive production techniques with success 
derived from their comparative vroximity to .two dense 
population clusters. The first omprised the Lunda,
Bemba, Ushi, Chishinga and Ngunbo peoples along the Luapula 
between lakes Mweru and Bangweulu, and the second comprised 
the Luba, Lomotwa and Zela along the Lualaba below the 
Lufira junction. The actual area of the mines was only 
sparcely populated by the Sanga and Lamba peoples, but of 
the three centres of the company’s operations Ruwe was well
1, TC/137* J.G. Watson, Manager Robert Williams and Company, 
to R. ’Williams, 14 February 1909*
2, Ibid*; also J.G* Watson to R. Williams, 5 April 1909*
3* Kapiri recruited its own labour force,
4, The recruiters were D. MacDonald, I.E. Stephenson, J.H* 
Hayes and R. Gillespie. See TC/137; J.G. Watson to
R. Williams, 14 February 1909*
5. Ibid. This is as opposed to being engaged by the recruiters
in their home areas. T asons for this lie within the
politics of trypanoso: described in section III below«
placed to draw on the Lualaba .supply areas, and the Star of 
the Congo was equally veil placed to draw on the Luapula 
supply areas. In addition, TCL possession of the Kansanshi 
deposit in Jlorth-VJnstern Rhodesia provided a minor collection 
and distribution point of Kaonde workers for all three 
properties*
From a very early stage, however, it was the Luapula which 
yielded most of the company’s black labour, and proximity 
to this supply was a major consideration in the location of 
the smelter at Lubumbashi (near the Star of the Congo) rather 
than at the more central Kambove. There were in fact some 
very good reasons why the company should have looked to 
North-Eastern Rhodesia for its labour supplies rather than 
to Katanga. In the first place the British companies 
controlling the UMHK had closer links with the British South 
Africa Company (BSA Company) administration in the Rhodesias 
than with the Belgian Comite Speciale clu Katanga (CSK) 
administration in Katanga (1), and in the second the fact 
that the BSA Company had successfully enforced a money tax 
by 1909 meant that the human resources 01 both the northern 
territories were ripe for exploitation just at the time that 
the UMHK was moving into its construction and development 
phases (2). In the Congo Free State, by contrast, colonial 
occupation of the country was still far less 01 a reality 
than in the ^hodesias, money had hardly appeared on the 
scene, and industry/state collaboration in the creation ard 
manipulation of markets was still very much in its infancy. 
Moreover, in North-Eastern Rhodesia the ecological limitations 
on the agricultural productivity of much of the territory 
together with its remoteness from the principal agricultural 
produce markets, meant that the enforcement of a money tax 
left Africans with no option but to enter into wage labour.
By the same token, however, the territory was attractive 
as a potential labour supply area to the mining interests 
of both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and it was 
certainly not with the requirements ox the Katanga mines in 
mind that the BSA Company had put in the preliminary work 
necessary to the creation of a labour reservoir. Indeed, 
although in 1906 the 17itv/atersrand Native Labour Association 
(WENELA) was already established in the area, in that year
1® Williams was himself a former employee of Rhodes, and,
at the head of the Zambezia Exploiing Company, had under­
taken much prospecting work for the BSA Company. Also, 
through the Rhodesia Katanga Junction Railway and Mineral 
Company, he was already or. the largest employers in
the territory.
2.c I-. H. Gann, A history of . bory. Rhodesia: early days to
1 9 9 3, (London, 1 9 0*0 , 1 iried between ps and
1 0s per annum.
it v/as ousted to make way for the Rhodesia Native Labour 
Bureau (RrlLB) ill an attempt by the BSA Company to satisfy 
the vastly increased unskilled labour requirements of a 
rapidly expanding industrial sector in Southern Rhodesia (l)« 
The appearance of Robert Williams and Company recruiters 
was thus hardly welcome in the territory, and in fact over 
the next five years the BSA Company attempted to place an 
embargo on the shipment of all labour from North-Eastern 
Rhodesia to Katanga,
The context of this attempt was the international concern 
aroused over the discovery of glossing nalpalis (the species 
of tsetse fly then held to be responsible for transmitting 
the trypanosomes to man) on the Luapula in 1905 (2)* There 
is little doubt but that the appearance of sleeping sickness 
caused widespread alarm amongst medical men in both the 
Rhodesias and Katanga, but there is equally little doubt 
that the curative and preventive measures taken by the 
BSA Company administration were not actuated by that concern 
alone*
By March 1907 the borders of North-Western Rhodesia had been 
closed to all outward migration to Angola and Katanga (3)e By 
November North-Eastern Rhodesia had been similarly closed 
to Katanga and German East Africa, and inward migration was 
permitted at selected medical control points only (4 )*
An area lying to the east of the Luapula and Lake Mweru, 
and to the south of the North-Eastern Rhodesia/Katanga border 
and Lake Tanganyika was declared an ' infected area* from 
which no-one was permitted to emigrate* (See map appended)*
1 * ESA Company, Directors’ report for the year ending 51 
March 1907, (Report of the Administrator, North-Eastern 
Rhodesia), 9 and 71*
2* For details of the investigation of sleeping sickness in 
the area see TC/UM 77/557; A Pearson, Medical Officer UiiHK, 
to Acting Administrator North-Western Rhodesia, 4 April 1910* 
in H. Buttgenbach to R* Williams, 25 May 1910*
3* TC/UM 77/357** A.c. Anderson for the Acting Administrator 
North-Western Rhodesia, to the O.C. Kasempa District, 23 
March 1907, in H. Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 4 March 1908* 
See also C. de vere Hunt for D.C„ Kasempa District, to 
TCL, Kansanshi, 7 April 1907, in II. Euttgenbach to 
R. Williams, 4 March 1908*
4* National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ/); BS1/65;
Acting Administrator Nc::th- Eastern Rhodesia, to BSA Company, 
London, 28 November 1907; and the Draft Rules under the 
Epidemic Contagious Diseases Regulations, 1907- The 
control points were at Madona, Chienji and Sumbu.
7c
Adjacent to this a far- larger area was designated a 1 guard 
area’ in which there was to be no labour recruitment, and 
the movement of Africans was to bo strictly controlled by 
passes (1). It was further made a punishable offence in 
fly free areas to employ men from infected areas, and all 
men recruited for Southern Rhodesia were to be medically 
examined (2 )*
In this lay the essence of BSA Company strategy. By- 
sealing the border abutting Katanga together with a strip 
of land adjoining the border but inside North-Eastern 
Rhodesia, it was intended to prevent any movement of
peoples from Rhodesia into Katanga. And although the
guard area (from which the major part of Robert V/illiams 
and Company's labour had been drawn) was closed to all 
recruitment, such labour as was forced out of the area by 
conventional pressures such as taxation would be compelled 
to move south and not west* And beyond the guard area the
RNLB stations were waiting.
In North-Western Rhodesia the results were dramatic. The 
number of men recruited by the RNLB jumped from 702 in the 
first half of 1906 to h0 ? 6 in the first half of 1 9 0? (3 )*
In North-Eastern Rhodesia the Bureau was far less successful
despite the fact that the economic dislocation of the
people affected by the preventive and control measures 
against trypanosomiasis was far more severe than elsewhere. 
In infected areas cotrol meant the widespread destruction 
of villages, and access to the Luapula and Lake Mweru was 
prohibited (A). In 1908 the Acting Administrator reported 
on these measures in the following terras:
every village on the shores of Tanganyika, 
on the Lovu, and on the Luapula from Luera
(Lwela) to Old Eort Rosebery is now abandoned,
and to avoid any chance of return has been 
burnt down. Except for the collection of
1 * NAZ/BS1/65* Acting-Administrator North-Eastern Rhodesia,
to BSA Company, London, 15 November 1907, dealing with
the fourth report of the Medical Officer, J.C. Spillane,
on whose recommendations the regulations were based.
Also J.C. Spillane, ninth report on sleeping sickness,
6 October 1908*
2 «. NAZ/BSl/65: Acting Administrator North-Eastern Rhodesia, 
to BSA Company, London, 15 November 1907*
3* Archives of the former Belgi r Ministry of Colonics
(hereafter BMC/); MOt/355VV5: RNLB, Report...for the six 
months ended 3 0 June 1910, A mexure A.
NAZ/P.Sl/ 6 5 1 Acting Adiniuist I.or North-Eastern. Rhodesia, 
to BSA Company, London, 5 Nov a box’ 190?*
growing crops there is little communication 
between the now villages and the river or 
the lake. Some of the villages may have to 
be moved again next year.. <. (1 )
Additional pressures were brought in the form of an 
increasing burden of taxation, and the further disruption 
of what wore then conventional African agricultural practices 
arising out of an administrative attack on the c it erne no 
(slash and burn) system in 1907/1908 (2). But although 
these .measures did have the effect of forcing increasing 
numbers of men into the labour market, the RHLB was not 
the main benficiary (3 )* For even if the closure of the 
Luapula prevented the recruiters of Robert Williams and 
Company from crossing the river to search out either labour 
or food - at least after 1908 (A), it was far less 
effective a check on African mobility than tho BSA
Company would have liked. In April 1909 the Medical Officer 
at Fort Rosebery noted that there were still numerous canoes 
on the Luapula, and he urged that they be destroyed. He 
argued that all their attempts to combat trypanosomiasis 
were being nullified by the non-cooperation of the Belgiaui 
authorities:
the opposite bank of the Luapula is thick with 
villages and more are being built (unfortunately 
it must be admitted that some of these at 
least are peopled by refugees from this side), 
and as long as these villages are allowed to 
remain on the river bar!: affording every 
facility for fishing a' the like, they will 
be a continual temptation and a continual 
menace to our own people-(5 )«
1 . NAZ/BS1/65: Acting Administrator North-Eastern Rhodesia,
to BSA Company, London, 18 December 1908*
2a In 19C7 the Administrator reporf^chat ‘in order to save
the country from deforestation and to facilitate the
control of natives and the collection of hut tax, orders
were given that indiscriminate destruction of trees was
to be discontinued...’ BSA Company, Directors’ report
for the year ending El March 1907, (Report of the
Administrator, North-Eastern Rhodesia), 71®1 »
3* Recruitment figures for the RNLB in North-Eastern Rhodes! 
remained well below those for North-Western Rhodesia. 
BMC/MOI 3551/^3: RNLB, report.,.for the six months ending 
3 0 June 1910, Anncxure A*
A. TC/UM 77/351: A. Bertholel to IK Buttgcnbach, 18 April 
1908, in H. Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 10 June 1908.
5. -NAZ/BS1/65: W.H.T. Storrs to P.M.O. Fort Jameson, 10
April 1909®
By December the Acting Administrator was describing the 
closure of the river as ’a dead letter' and arguing that 
the 'popularity' of the Katanga mines v/as such that no 
system of patrol could be effective. He went on 'so long 
as the natives have no other lav/ful sphere of labour, they 
will evade the restrictions on their movements' (1 )*
Proceeding from this assessment the BSA Company administration 
then prepared to abandon the notion of inviolable infected 
areas, and recommended that labour then evading the patrols 
should be channelled south (2). Opposition to this 
recommendation came from two directions. On the one hand 
the Director of the London Sleeping Sickness Bureau v/as not 
convinced of the medical advisability of the move, and felt 
that the BSA Company's main reason for suggesting it v/as 
1 an accession of from seven to ten thousand native labourers' (3 )* 
On the other, the UKHK argued that even if it were desirable 
it would not prove possible to divert the flow of labour from 
the Katanga mines, and that a far more realistic approach 
would be one that made safe the passage of labourers to the 
mines by permitting a programme of controlled recruitment (4)* 
Nevertheless, the suggestion v/as eagerly accepted by the 
London Board of the BSA Company, and early in 1910 they 
authorized direct recruitment in the infected areas of 
Tanaganyika, Mweru and Luapula for the Southern Rhodesian 
mines (5 )*
By this time the problem of maintaining adequate supplies
1 . NAZ/BS1/65: Acting Administrator North-Eastern Rhodesia,
to BSA Company, London, 18 December 1908.
2 * NAZ/BS2/109: A. May, PMO North-Eastern Rhodesia, report
on sleeping sickness in North-Eastern Rhodesia, 15 December 
1909*
3c NAZ/BS2/109: A.C. Bagshawe, Director of Sleeping Sickness
Bureau, to Secretary of State Colonial Office, 28 February 1910.
4. NAZ/BS2/109: A* Pearson to Acting Administrator North-
Eastern Rhodesia, 4 April 1910.
5* NAZ/BS2/109: BSA Company, London, to the Administrator
Southern Rhodesia, 12 Febn a y 191fJ Administrator Southern 
Rhodesia to BSA Company,; n, 8' January 1910; and BSA
Company, London, to Act.: d inis rator North-Eastern
Rhodesia, 12 February 1 J0 .
of cheap black labour for the construction and development 
programme on the Katanga mines was acute, and the pressure 
on the UMiLK to find a longer term solution was intense. In 
1907 Robert Williams and Company had proposed to open up 
Angola to recruitment (1) but the proposal was, at the time, 
rejected on grounds of expense (2). By 1910, however, the 
UKHK had turned about on the issue (3) as labour shortages 
were driving up wages. At the same time their recruitment 
activities inside Katanga were intensified. By 1909 Robert 
Williams and Company had recruiters operating in the 
Lualaba basin as far north as the Lufira junction (h), and the 
company Medical Officer was recommending the extension of 
recruitment into tho infected areas further north. He 
argued that since it was going to be essential for the 
nines to draw most of their labour from the north, such a 
source should be cultivated rather than isolated regardless 
of the presence of g 1 o s s 1 n a r? alp a 1 i s (5 ) *
But within Katanga the potential labour supply areas were not 
the ecological traps of the Bemba plateau in North-Eastern 
Rhodesia, and labour recruiters had to contend not only 
with an ineffectual administration, but with the comparative 
profitability of peasant production. As elsewhere in 
Southern Africa the injection of large amounts of capital 
in support of industrial development had initially created 
considerable demand for foodstuffs which was met almost 
entirely by local African producers on the basis of existing 
agricultural methods (6 ). In order to satisfy their foodstuff 
requirements the company had established buying stations at 
ever increasing distances from the mines. By 1903 it was 
purchasing grain from African producers in an area extending
la TC/UK 77/35?: A, Bertholet to H. Buttgenbach, 2o December
1907, in H. Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 22 February 1908.
2. TC/UM 108: H. Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 1 February 1908.
3c TC/UM 108: II. Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 11 May 1910.
A. TC/13?: J.G. Watson to J.H* Hayes, 29 June 1909, in
J.G. Watson to R. 'Williams, 26 July 1909o Hayes was the 
company recruiter for the aroa of the Lualaba basin to 
its junction with the Lufira.
5. TC/UM 77/357: A. Pearson to A. Bertholet, 20 April 1909c
6 . On the development of peasant production in similar 
circumstances elsewhere Central and Southern Africa 
see C. Bundy, ’The emergence and decline of a South African 
peasantry*, African Affair , 71, 2 8 5 , 1972, 389-388; and 
I.R. Phimister, ’Peasant Auction in Southern Rhodesia’, 
African Affairs, 73, 291, Wl-, 217-228.
* /,
over much of Katanga and v/ell into North-Eastern and 
North-Western Rhodesia, and in that year total purchases 
amounted to just under 1000 tons (1). Prices were high (2 ) 
and there is little doubt but that many producers were 
making quite enough cash to satisfy their v/ants through the 
sale of agricultural produce without recourse to v/age labour.
In North-Western Rhodesia, lor example, the Department of 
Mines and Lands complained that ’the system of paying cash 
for grain is conducive to idleness and by far the greater 
proportion of tax paid during the last -year...is gained from 
the latter source* (3 ), and it is instructive that the desire 
of the UMIIK and TCL to make v/age payments in cash rather 
than kind (4) did not carry over to food purchases (5).
There was clearly concensus on the part of employers that 
the role of African agricultural production should be a 
purely supportive one lying outside of the cash nexus - and 
indeed their interpretation of the term 'idleness* to mean 
all. economic activity other than wage labour suggests an 
interesting conceptual differentiation as to the place of 
capitalist and non-capitalist production modes in colonial 
Africa.
By 1908 the field manager of Robert Williams and Company,
J.G. Watson, was arguing that the company should no longer 
rely on Africans for food, but should encourage the formation 
of a local white agricultural capitalist interest (6 ), and 
early in 1909 he reported that three white farmers had been 
induced to establish themselves in the vicinity of Kansanshi (7 ). 
But the process of extricating the company from a situation 
of dependence on African producers v/as necessarily a gradual 
one, and in 1510 there were still numerous areas in Katanga 
v/here Africans were involved solely (and profitably) in peasant 
production (3). Jn March 19111 hov.over, Robert Williams and
1 * TC/137: J.G. Watson to R. Williams, 14 February 1909*
2* TC/UM 108: A Bertholet to H. Buttgenbach, 31 March 1908.
3* NAZ/B52/l4l: D e p a r t m e n t  of Lands and Mines (North-Western
Rhodesia), Report for the year ending 31 March 190o.
4* TC/UM 75/353: H. Buttgenbach to A. Bertholet, 14 November 
190?; and TC/UM 75/546: H. Buttgenbach to A. Bertholot,
6 March 1903.
5* TC/UM 108: A. Bertholet to II. Buttgenbach, 10 June 1903.
i
6 . TC/137; J.G. Watson to R. Williams, 26 November 1908.
7« TC/137; J.G. Watson to R. Williams, 23 January 1909*
i f
8 e TC/UM 108: E. Halcwijch, M- ncrnl M nagcr UMIIK, to II. Butt­
genbach, 24 February 19‘U , in H. Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 
8 April 1910. /
Company concluded a major agreement with the firm of 
King and Werner in North-Western Rhodesia, under which the 
latter contracted to supply the mines with the bulk ox 
their requirements of both grain and beef (1 ), and by 
November the northern buying stations had all been closed 
down (2)* The consequent loss of markets, overselling at 
depressed prices, and the failure of the 1 9 1 0 / 1 9 1 1 sorghum 
crop wore altogether too much for the peasant producers#
Watson reported on the results in the following terms:
The country has changed a good deal during the 
last two years and not for the better# This 
season’s crop of kaffir corn, which is the 
staple food of the people, was a failure. The 
whole country is in a state of starvation, and 
we are a long way from next season's harvest*
The village people are in a miserable state, 
and for the time being are subsisting on roots 
and anything edible they can find in the bush#
In many of the villages all one sees are a few
old women and children. The men have disappeared (3),
By this time, however* industry/state collaboration on the 
mobilization of labour in Katanga had moved a long way# In 
March 1910 the UMHK had made a direct appeal to the local 
representative of the CSK, E# Wangermec, for assistance in 
what was seen a situation of serious labour scarcity 
aggravated by numerous desertions to railway contractors, the 
continued closure of the Northern Rhodesian borders, and the 
profitability of peasant production in the territory# He was 
in particular requested (a) to appoint officials specifically 
to 'encourage' men to work (as v/age labourers), and (b) to 
impose and enforce a money tax (R)« The C3K agreed the 
latter recommendation (5 )1 but it soon became evident that 
to stimulate the flow of labour was not, by itself, enough#
The high prices paid to African producers for foodstuffs, 
together with the increasing competition for unskilled 
industrial workers as m e  railhead moved closer to Lubumbashi 
and the Star, had produced a wage spiral that threatened the 
very basis of the system of labour utilization in the territory (6 )
1o See TC/UM 108: Robert Williams and Company to King and 
Werner, Kalomo, North-Western Rhodesia, 21 March 1911*
2 # TC/137: Watson to R. Williams, 8 November 1911®
3. Ibid,
A-# TC/UM 1 0 8: E, Halowijck to H# Buttgrnbach, 2 h February
191C, in H« Buttgenbach to R. Williams, 8 April 1910.
3* TC/UM 108: II# Buttgenbach to R# Williams, 11 May 1910.
i '
6 . The Rhodesian rail li: k -Rich it h«* d been intended would
go on up to the southern < nd of Lake Tanganyika, was diverted 
to service the Katang • i s0
Ac a result industry took the decision to launch a labour 
bureau on the lines of the RNLB and WENELA, and to equip 
it with the monopsonistic powers necessary to the enforcement 
of a standard wage structure at a level acceptable to the 
UI-NfK (1) * By July the bureau, the Bourse du Travail du 
Katanga (BTK), had been formally constituted and charged 
with the organisation of the recruitment and distribution 
of labour within Katanga, and the importation and repatriation 
of workers from other provinces or countries (2). Tariffs 
for members ranged from 12 francs per worker engaged for a 
term not exceeding three months, to y d francs per worker 
engaged for a term not exceeding twelve months. Tariffs 
for non members were double those for members. In addition 
a sum of three francs per worker was levied on each engagement, 
and provision was made for penalties on members going 
outside the DTK for their labour to the extent of 100 francs 
per infringement (3)* The Bourse was then intended to take 
over completely the recruiting operations of Robert Lillians 
and Company.
Accordingly, when the Katanga administration reopened 
negotiations with the BSA Company to resolve the border 
closure issue at a conference held at Fort Rosebery in October 
1910, Robert Lillians and Company was not invited (b )* But 
though the North-Eastern Rhodesian administration did agree 
to permit the controlled flow of labour through medical 
checkpoints on the Luapula (5), this was conditional upon 
Robert Williams and Company retaining control of recruiting 
operations inside North-Eastern Rhodesia (6 ). Nor was this
1 . TC/UM 108: H. Buttgenbach : R. 'Williams, 11 Hay 1910*
2« TC/UM 75/3^6: BTK General Regulations adopted by the
general meeting of 29 July 1910, in H. Buttgenbach to 
R« Williams, 3 August 1 9 1 0.
3» Ibid.
bo NAZ/BSl/Sp: Conference of officials from North-Eastern
Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo at Fort Rosebery, 17 October 
1910.
3c Ibid. Gheur, the Chef de Zone Ilaut Luapula, agreed to apply
for authority to prevent the employment of any North- 
Eastern Rhodesian African in Katanga, unless he was in 
possession of a pass and a medical certificate.
6 c BMC/M0I 3331/^6: R. Williams to J. Cousin, BTK, 1o December
1910. Recruiting in North- •astern Rhodesia commenced in 
March 1911, and in North-We orn Rhodesia in August. See 
TC/1 3 8 : J.G. Watson to R. ,E 11 inns, 12 March 1912; TC/137: 
O'.G. Watson to R. Wil'j i • •.*;i;;, > August 1911; and NAZ/BS2/29*
BSA Company, London, to m i  rtrator Southern Rhodesia,
13 April 191%
uho only disappointment for the BTK. Demand for labour
in Southern Rhodesia v/as still growing. The BSA Company
Directors* Report of 1911 noted that ’the continued
expansion of the industries of Southern Rhodesia has again
been handicapped by shortage and irregularity in the supply
of native labour...It is essential therefore...that large
numbers should be attracted from Northern Rhodesia and other
neighbouring territories' (1). In Northern Rhodesia too
Kansanshi mine was expanding its operations (2), and
whereas in 1 c)0 o local supplies had been considered adequate
to satisfy its unskilled labour requirements (3)* hy 1911
the mine v/as beginning to experience chronic ‘shortage* (4)«
Moreover, a white agricultural capitalist interest was
rapidly growing in response both to the favourable conditions
created by the BSA Company and the new market opportunities
in Katanga (p). As a result the recruitin g coneess ion to
Robert Williams and Company was restricted to 1000 men per
annum only (6), and was hedged about with numerous restrictions (7)«
Consequently the BTK and the UMHK were compelled to look to
Katanga for the bulk of the labour requirements of the nines,
and in the two years after the formation, of the Bourse the
1. BSA Company, Directors' report for the year ending 31 March.
1910* " ...
2. Production of copper at the mine began in 1908, three years 
before the UMNK, and in 1910 the capacity of the smolder 
increased by the installation of a new blast furnace. See 
J.A. Bancroft, Mining in Northern Rhodesia, (BSA Company, 
London, 19$1), 67; and BSA jmpany, Directors' report for 
the year ending 51 March 1911$ 57*
3. NAZ/BS2/141: Department of Mines and Lands (North-
Western Rhodesia), Report for the year ending 31 March 19Co «
4. See for example TC/1 3 8 : J. Merrilees, Kansanshi, to J.G, 
Watson, 2b June 1912, in J.G. Watson to R* Williams,
10 July 1912.
5. BSA Company, Director's renort for the year ending 31 March
1911, 55* ‘ - “ .. ~ ..
6. NAZ/BS2/29; BSA Company to R. Williams, 10 April 1911«
7* BMC/MOI 3551/46: R. Williams to J. Cousin, 18 December 1910.
In terms of the regulations governing the concession recruits 
had to be medically examined both before registration and 
at special centres at I Idol a ami Bv/ana Mkubwa (to be main­
tained at the expense of Rob rt Williams and Company), they 
had to follow prescribed rout the period of engagement 
could not exceed six months, red one half of all wages had 
to be deferred and paid ov< the end of each contract
in the recruit's ho . M: Moreover, recruiting was
allowed for one mine onl;/, tV„; Star*
UMHK maintained a constant pressure on the state to act to 
guarantee its effectiveness# A major problem was that its 
monopsony remained largely theoretical. In October 1910  
Ilalewijck complained of the 'unfair* competition of small 
employers, and what ho saw as the non-cooperation of officials. 
In the north, he argued, they were competing with the ivory 
and rubber trade which had been just as profitable for the 
people as the food trade in the south. The chefs do r>oste 
were themselves recruiting workers and porters for the 
government military occupation and so providing further 
competition, although he admitted that the imposition of a 
money tax had eased the situation. The solution, he insisted, 
lay in government support for the BTK (1). And although 
Uangermee rejected any accusations that the state had not 
cooperated with the Bourse (2 ) in January 1911 he did 
instruct the chefs do zone to do all in their power to assist 
the organisation. They were to provide it with full 
information about people living in the zone, they were to 
send all tax defaulters to the recruiting stations, and they 
were to advise the people that it operated with the full 
approval of the government (3)« From May a representative 
of the state actually sat with the BTK management committee (A )* 
But even this was not enough. In January 1912 the BTK called 
on the Minister of Colonies for direct aid in the sum of 
1 0 0 , 0 0 0 francs to assist in the expansion of their operations 
in Katanga in order to make the province independent of 
•Northern Rhodesian labour (5)* This was agreed, and in April 
the chefs do zone were issued with direct instructions to get 
recruitment off the ground - specific reference being made 
to recent state * investment* in the Bourse (6 ). The kind of 
collaboration necessary to the effective mobilization of the 
human resources of the territory was thus finally a reality.
e dThese measures v/ere back/ up by the introduction of legislation
1c BMC/MOI 3 5 5 2/A8 : E. Halewijck, report, 31 October 1910, in 
Ho Buttmenbach to the CSK, 1? December 1910C
2c BMC/MOI 3552/A8 *. E. Tangerinee to Minister of Colonies,
9 March 1911.
3- BMC/MOI. 3552/A8 : E. V/angerm<5e to Chefs de Zone, 1A January 
1911 * iu E. Tangerinee to Minister of Colonies, 15 February
1911.
A- BMC/MOI 3552/A8: Minister of Colonies to BTK, 1 May 1911*
5* BMC/MOI 3552/A8 : L. Cousin t Minister of Colonies, 20
January 1 9 1 2* I
6 » BMC/MOI 3552/Ad: Minister of Colo- ios to L. Cousin, 1
February 1912; a,d Vice-Governor G neral to Chefs de Zone,
9 April 1912.
governing contracts for the hire of cervices and recruitment 
of labour (1 ). The decree, which applied to 'any native of 
the Congo or o:f neighbouring colonies, inmatriculated or 
not, engaged by a European1 (2 ), stipulated that all wages 
had to be paid in cash (3 )* In addition it provided penalties 
for breach of contract which included imprisonment with hard 
labour for a period not exceeding seven days, and fines of 
up to 2 00 francs (4) - the significance of this rather peculiar 
balance of options being the very limited value to the large 
corporations of the power to imprison recalcitrant workers 
compared to the value ox the power to withhold wages*
V
Thus by 1911 a fairly formidble organization had been created 
to realise the commercial potential of the mineral and 
human resources of the region. It v/as certainly at an early 
stage of its development, but its principal characteristics 
were already clearly defined. The most pronounced of these 
was the very close collaboration between the largo international 
corporations and the Belgian state in the exploitation of 
the province. Through its bolding in the CSK the state 
retained the right to two-thirds of all profits flowing 
from that company's involvement in the two main consortia 
operating in the area (5)* To project that interest the 
apparatus of administration was geared to the creation of 
conditions favourable to the profitable operation of those 
consortia, and in practical terms this meant the mobilization
i
1« Decree of 17 August 1910* By this time the administration 
of the territory had passed out of the hands of the CSK*
In 1908 the Congo Free State was formally annexed by 
Belgium, and by March 1910 it had taken over the Katanga 
administration leaving control of land and min erals in 
the hands of the CSK. In fact there were few real changes 
involved, and on the transfer of power V/angermde, the CSK 
representative, merely assumed the title of Vice Governor 
General.
2. Decree of 1? August 1910 as amended by the decree ox 2.3 
January 1912, article 1,..
3 * Ibid* ? article 1 0.
4. Ibid., article 3 8 .
3 e See B. Fetter, 'L 1Union Minifcre du Haut Katanga 1920-1940;
la naissanco d'une sou; culture totalitaire', Cahiera du
CFDAF, 6 , 1973? for a <u at ion c " the interests of the 
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of the human resources of the area to mc-et the requirements 
of both mines and railways (1) <- This had involved the 
introduction of a cash nexus under which the various 
administrative pressures could bo directed to the production 
of either labour power (on the basis of conventional capitalist 
relations) or foodstuffs (on the basis of an adaptation of 
traditional agricultural practices). The principle of 
market manipulation had thus been firmly established, and 
the first steps taken to control by monopsonistic organization 
the terms on which Africans offered their labour or produce 
for sale to suit the developing requirements of capital*
It has already been argued that such requirements under the 
unskilled labour intensive production techniques of the 
period were for a continuous supply of manual labour at 
minimal cost - and it is clear that such requirements 
presupposed a migrant system* It was only because industrial 
labour costs constituted no more than the price of the 
subsistence of che single worker during the period of his 
employment together with the price of transporting him to and 
from his rural home that such techniques were viable, and 
it was the sole purpose of the BTK to protect the wage rdgime 
adjudged by the UMHK to be appropriate to such techniques* 
Moreover, the low skill content and arduousness of most tasks 
performed, and the very limited survival capability of a 
highly parasitised, undernourished labour force, made a short 
average term of service intrinsically desirable.
For the worker so long as his earnings (direct and indirect) 
were fixed at a level below that required to maintain both 
himself and his immediate dependants in the urban milieu, and 
so long as the major agricultural produce markets were closed 
to him, he had little option but to persist with some form 
of peasant or subsistence production at the same time as he 
engaged in wage labour in industry. Moreover, if the 
dependence of workers on two modes of production necessitated 
a high degree of mobility between them in order to guarantee 
their short term survival (migrancy), it also ensured that they 
remained without the means of improving their longer term 
position in either* Such was the structural trap in which 
Africans found themselves -- the essence of industrial labour 
strategy in colonial Africa®
1 See J.P* Peemans, ’The rol of the state in the capital 
accumulation process: t ■ c .. of the Congo during the 
colonial period i8g5-1c.\ O' i n versj be de Louvain, Inst.it.ut 
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